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Limitations
What the CLI does not protect against, and where it stops.
While your Vault is unlocked, anything that runs as you can use it
An AI agent with access to your terminal is included. geslar unlock leaves an unlock record on this computer, sealed with the local key. Until it ends, any process on your account can run geslar read, run or inject as you, with no approval and without an agent profile: an agent profile and its approvals protect your Vault only from an agent that does not also have your unlocked session. Run geslar lock before you let an agent work in your terminal, or run the agent under a separate OS user. The unlock also ends by itself: 15 minutes after the last use (every use moves that deadline), and in any case after the time you gave to geslar unlock (30 minutes by default, at most 8 hours). geslar lock removes the record on this computer, does not call the server, and succeeds when nothing is unlocked. With --key-storage file the key that seals the record needs the local password, which is asked for in the terminal.
The environment of a command started by geslar run can be read by other processes of the same OS user
geslar run puts the secrets in the command's environment, and the CLI does nothing to hide it from them. On Linux the same user (and root) can read /proc/<pid>/environ; other systems have their own ways for a process of the same user to inspect it. On a shared machine, run the command in a container or under a dedicated user.
There is no offline mode
The CLI keeps no copy of your Vault: its local state is the sealed sign-in, the unlock record (the key and its deadlines), the agent profiles and the MCP command patterns. Without a connection to Geslar, login, unlock, whoami, read, run, inject and item list fail with exit code 1 and "Can't connect to Geslar (network error)."; run starts nothing. status reports your sign-in from local state but cannot check the unlock, so it shows the Vault as locked. lock, mcp allow-cmd, mcp grants, mcp revoke and agent remove (without --revoke) work without a connection; agent remove --revoke asks the server first and deletes nothing if that fails. agent list shows each profile as unreachable. logout signs out on this computer and says that the server could not be told, so the sign-in may stay valid until it expires.
Other limits
- Masking covers the literal value only.
geslar runhides the exact secret value in the command's output. A command that prints an encoded form (base64, URL-encoded, hex) is not masked. Treat masking as protection against accidental leaks, not as a security boundary.geslar injectoutput is not masked at all. - A command you start can send its secrets away.
geslar runputs the secrets in the command's environment. If that command is malicious or compromised, it can send them anywhere it can reach. The same holds for a command an agent is allowed to start: a command that can run code (a shell,node,python,npxand the like) can read the secrets in its own environment. A command pattern is not a security boundary; the Vault you gave the agent, its time and read limits, and the approval by a person with 2FA are. - A person at a terminal can print any value they may read. Anything that runs as you can read what you can read. The CLI is not a sandbox against a malicious process on your own account.
--return-stdout-tailis best effort. If you start the MCP server with it, the model receives a filtered tail of the program's output. The filter is not a security boundary, and values shorter than 6 characters are never masked in it (geslar runitself masks a value of any length).- Local key storage. On Linux without a Secret Service the key lives only in the kernel keyring of the login session and does not survive a restart; use
--key-storage file, or install a Secret Service. An agent profile andgeslar mcp serveneed a persistent OS keychain. A forgotten password of the local key file cannot be recovered;geslar logoutworks without it and clears the local state; sign in again afterwards. - A token in the environment. While
geslarruns withGESLAR_SERVICE_TOKEN, the token is in its own process environment (on Linux,/proc/<pid>/environis readable by the same user). It is not passed on to anything the CLI starts. In a CI job, load secrets for the whole job only where you must; see CI and GitHub Action. - The server sees which item is fetched. It does not see the value; each read of an item is recorded in your account's audit log.
- Windows
.cmdand.batfiles cannot be started directly bygeslar run; run them throughcmd /c. - Claude Desktop on Windows is not yet verified on a real client; see MCP.
- No hosted MCP server. Chat apps that run only in the browser or in the cloud cannot use Geslar's MCP server; see MCP.